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INTRODUCTION
Is phenomenology of any use for architects? Does it provide 
either a standpoint or a tool to address what is at stake in the 
work of architects? This collection of essays constitutes an attempt 
to give a positive answer to these two questions.
 There is at least one potentially decisive objection that can be 
raised against a phenomenological approach to architecture: the 
fact that the essence of architecture is itself already phenomeno-
logical, and thus a phenomenological treatment for the subject is 
in fact superfluous. Is there any discipline more fundamentally 
phenomenological in its approach than architecture? Thus, the 
objection states, the manner in which architects apprehend real-
ity does not require the method and aims of phenomenology as 
it is already intrinsically phenomenological. In Eye and Mind, 
Merleau-Ponty concluded his analysis of vision by saying that 
painters have an intuitive knowledge of what the phenomenolo-
gist is aiming to understand by the use of concepts: “Painters 
always knew this.”1  Why should this “silent science”2 of vision, 
immanent to the act of painting, not be said to belong—in a dif-
ferent but no less radical fashion—to architects?
 Le Corbusier once suggested that: “the basic materials of city 
planning are sun, sky, trees, steel and cement, in that strict order 
of importance.”3  This comment is particularly pertinent in the 
current context. This list of elements in fact spells out a program 
that pertains to all architecture as such; it is Le Corbusier’s 
attempt at enunciating a hierarchy of materials that expresses the 
very essence of architecture. Only by firmly taking a stand on the 
ground of the most elementary of things will the architect be in 
2a position to elaborate and realize their own artifacts. Hence the 
presence of “cement” in the hierarchy of elements can be seen as 
both literal, in terms of cement as a material, and also symbolic 
of architectural work in general. What Le Corbusier teaches us, 
and which forms the “silent science” of the architect, is that 
cement cannot be consolidated in form as a building unless it 
rests on the solid soil of what Husserl calls the “life-world” 
(Lebenswelt). What is here referred to as sun, sky—or space—, 
and tree is, in Husserlian terms: “the only real world, the one that 
is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and 
experienceable—our everyday life-world.”4  This means that the 
architect necessarily deals with the reality of our living experi-
ence, because what they create emerges from the things 
themselves.
 Why should the things that architects encounter in the course 
of their work be considered any different from those which one 
experiences through the phenomenological gaze? It is well known 
that the mode of thinking inaugurated by Husserl in the last 
years of the nineteenth century, which he termed “phenomenol-
ogy,” presents itself from the outset as a move “back to the things 
themselves” (zu den Sachen selbst).5  In its original context, this 
motto was above all else designed to oppose the dominant para-
digms of positivism and naturalist psychology, whose naive con-
ceptions of the nature of “fact” and “experience” were directly 
conducive to the articulation of any number of “absurd theo-
ries.”6  In its later manifestations, phenomenology traveled even 
further along the path of the investigation concerning the nature 
of the thing.  There were very good reasons for this development. 
Indeed, the move back that Husserl intended to promote was in 
no sense a mere consideration of the perceived thing—if by this 
one understands that this thing, be it stone, book, table or tree, 
constitutes in itself an absolute and unquestionable fact.  On the 
contrary, Husserl’s revolutionary idea was to conceive of the 
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thing as being itself “constituted” by the human mind, and there-
fore as requiring a specific procedure—which he called “reduc-
tion”—in order to be grasped in all its reality.  Husserlian phe-
nomenology suggests that the ultimate ground on which reality 
is to be encountered can be reached only by means of a thorough 
investigation bearing on the acts of consciousness.  Once all prior 
theories, conceptions or bias of any kind have been “reduced,” 
the thing discloses itself on the field of consciousness as a pure 
mental content (Erlebnis).  The task of phenomenology thus 
consists in identifying the diverse guises of “intentionality” giving 
rise to the appearance of the thing as phenomenon.  It is on the 
basis of this phenomenological life of ours that the “life-world” 
can be apprehended anew.  Modern science and its mathematiza-
tion of nature only succeeds in elaborating the “garb of ideas”7 
that covers the reality beneath.
Phenomenological approach of architecture
From this standpoint, it can be assumed that architecture, as it 
essentially deals with things as phenomena, always stands on the 
ground of the life-world, and thus already knows what the phe-
nomenologist is seeking to explore.
 However strong this architectural objection to phenomenol-
ogy may appear, it is nonetheless also possible to counter with 
the suggestion that in fact in its recent history architecture seems 
to have deserted its own phenomenological ground.  This orien-
tation—which characterizes modernity8—gave way to construc-
tions whose reference was at best purely theoretical, without any 
particular respect for the phenomenal content.  At its worst 
modern architectural design may be seen as short-sighted in its 
attempt to satisfy purely practical purposes.  If one considers the 
bulk of contemporary cities worldwide, the buildings in which 
most people are forced to live, dwell and work provide concrete 
4evidence in favor of the claim that the phenomenological core of 
architecture has too often been forgotten or even lost entirely.
 Is it always so obvious to architects that “to it, the world of 
actually experiencing intuition, belongs the form of space-time 
together with all the bodily [körperlich] shapes incorporated in it; 
it is in this world that we ourselves live, in accord with our bodily 
[leiblich], personal way of being”?9 Husserl’s remark, which he 
considered as important but nonetheless “trivial,” may not be as 
self-evident as it appears at first sight for contemporary archi-
tects.  If it can be established that the formula of human presence 
to things and world is always at risk of fading into oblivion or 
neglect, such phenomenological work might well not be consid-
ered so superfluous to architects.
 A glimpse at the work of Heidegger will help us take a step 
further towards the elucidation of this suspicion harbored by 
architects towards phenomenological analysis.  The issue of the 
thing remained the constant theme of phenomenological 
thought.  Heidegger never renounced this Husserlian injunction; 
rather he extended it and extrapolated to its ultimate philosophi-
cal conclusions.  It is possible to say that, with Heidegger, what 
had until then been an issue acquired the status of a true question. 
Relying on the double meaning of the German word “Sache,” 
Heidegger claims that the thing is itself the task.  In the first pages 
of Being and Time, the necessity of going “back to the things 
themselves” is straightforwardly considered as providing a proper 
preliminary definition of phenomenology.10  However, unlike 
other sciences or disciplines, phenomenology is characterized by 
the fact that it is not in possession of the “thing content” 
(Sachhaltigkeit) of its object: “‘Phenomenology’ does not name 
the object of its research, nor characterizes the title of its content 
as things.”11  The content of the thing as such is the very object 
of phenomenology, which therefore turns its investigation in the 
direction of the “how” (das Wie) of the thing, the way it is given 
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to us as thing, and consequently its reality inasmuch as it is pres-
ent to us.  There is thus nothing surprising about the fact that, in 
his later works, deliberately switching from the plural to the sin-
gular form—from Sachen to Sache—, Heidegger emphasized the 
concept of thing in such a way that it became a synonym for the 
task and end of thinking itself.12  Once it has been integrated 
into the question of Being (Seinsfrage), the thinking of things 
(Sachen) finally resolves into the thing—or task (Sache)—of 
thinking.
 If architecture itself can lose its footing on the ground of the 
things themselves, it has to be assumed that the phenomenologi-
cal reality of things is not to be taken for granted in the work of 
architects.  This phenomenological reality is thus best considered 
a goal to be achieved for the architect rather than an already 
secured base.  To put it differently, one may say that the ground 
of architectural practice is in fact the goal itself: architecture must 
pursue the task of securing its own possibility by longing for the 
thing.  It is in this sense that phenomenology makes a valuable 
contribution to the work of architects, providing them with a 
means to recover the things themselves, on the ground of which 
rests the possibility of the discipline of “architecture.” 
Phenomenology does not merely offer another “theory,” nor a 
“philosophy” of architecture, but rather deals directly with the 
genuine and essential meaning of architecture.  Far from impos-
ing its own thesis, phenomenology brings out the primordial 
“thetic” act that is at the bottom of all architectural practice. 
Indeed, the “thing” is less a graspable entity than a question, 
which always needs to be heard and answered anew, because it 
expresses the most original bond that links human beings to the 
world.  Properly understood, the question of the thing is none 
other than the question of the world.  Architecture takes its stand 
from the things themselves, that is, it springs from the encounter 
between the human and things, which itself assumes the form of 
6an injunction: man has to dwell.  The question of the world, first 
articulated by phenomenology, albeit in a veiled manner, 
constitutes both the ground and the horizon of all architectural 
practice.  More than any other human activity, architecture 
receives as its task to “make world”—the Heideggerian “welt-
bilden”—by inserting human presence into the whole of 
phenomena.
 Accordingly, apprehending the “things themselves” does not 
primarily mean to focus on the sensible data of things.  Such a 
return, in itself, does not even require phenomenology.13  Rather, 
it must be made clear that the sensible qualities of materials— 
environment, shapes, spaces and volumes—which are of such 
great importance to architects, are only single and particular 
aspects of the broader question of the world.  This is the reason 
why the philosopher Merleau-Ponty has always been popular 
with architects, inspired by his analysis of perception.  Despite its 
irreducible singularity, the work of Merleau-Ponty is in perfect 
continuity with Husserl’s ambition.  For the French philosopher, 
the ideal of access “to the things themselves” emerges as the very 
definition of philosophy itself: “It is at the same time true that 
the world is what we see and that, nonetheless, we must learn to 
see it….  It is the things themselves, from the depths of their 
silence, that it (i.e., philosophy) wishes to bring to expression.”14 
The paradoxical task of philosophy is thus to conquer the soil of 
perceptual evidence, which always presents itself to our eyes as a 
plain and evident fact. “We see the things themselves, the world 
is what we see,”15 and yet, there is something that we constantly 
and tacitly put aside while experiencing the world as evident 
through perception: the world as such, that is, “the problem of 
our access to the world”16 and the “perceptual faith” by which it 
is given to us.  Though accessible to us via the tactile and visual 
senses, the thing itself remains nevertheless veiled because our 
perceptual life does not manifest itself as such in all that it reveals; 
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thus we are led to an interpretation of things via reflection.  Every 
reader of the Phenomenology of Perception knows this critique of 
the “philosophy of reflection” (philosophie réflexive), and of the 
naive attitude upon which it rests, and which it intellectualizes. 
But such a critical move attains its full dimension and its true 
meaning only when integrated into a broader attempt designed 
to overcome the terms of classical ontology.  In the writings of 
his last period, the issue of perception is replaced by a more fun-
damental concern: taking up the full range of the Heideggerian 
questions, Merleau-Ponty now directly addresses the issue of 
being and aims at providing a new intelligibility to the “there is” 
(il y a) conceived as primary openness to the world.  It is only 
within this new framework that the question of the “thing itself ” 
can be raised, and the radical consequences of this philosophical 
emphasis on the body explicated.  If based on Merleau-Pontian 
premises, a phenomenological approach will permit a broad-
ranging reconsideration of the perceptual content of 
architecture.
 This brief outline of the three major figures of phenomenol-
ogy (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), and of their attitude 
toward (the) thing(s), provides a roadmap to the philosophical 
perspectives predominant in this book.  However, the phenome-
nological tradition was not the only factor that influenced the 
original conception of this collection of essays.  Indeed, one may 
better refer to “context,” in the most meaningful sense of the 
term, as opposed to “influence” or “philosophical choice.”  This 
“context” refers to the fact that this book was edited and pub-
lished in Kyoto; and in a more profound way, Japan constituted 
the cultural landscape in which problems with the work at every 
stage were addressed.
Fujimori Terunobu, Teahouse Tetsu 徹, Yamanashi prefecture, 2005. 
Photograph by Masuda Akihisa
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Architecture in relation with cultural, social, and 
physical milieus
In recent history, one of the main factors linking phenomenol-
ogy to Japan is the influence of the Kyoto school of philosophy, 
led by Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), and followed by a genera-
tion of philosophers.  Unlike Nishida himself, this next generation 
traveled to Europe, meeting key figures on the European scene, 
such as Husserl and Heidegger, Bergson, and Sartre.  One of 
Nishida’s aims was to create a “world philosophy”: a genuine phi-
losophy that could be considered a bridge between Western phi-
losophy and Asian thought that goes beyond mere assimilation 
of western concepts.  Instead Nishida sought to create a dialogue 
between western philosophy and the insights of Confucianism, 
Daoism, and Buddhism.17  By doing so, Kyoto philosophers have 
reexamined Hegel’s standpoint on the course of History as 
moving from East to West, the idea of the Orient as founded on 
an “immediate consciousness”18 of the world, and a non distan-
ciation between the subject and the object.  As Deleuze and 
Guatari stated: “The Orient is unaware of the concept because it 
is content to put the most abstract void and the most trivial being 
in a relationship of coexistence without any mediation.”19  This 
relative absence of concept, an anti-metaphysical and anti-posi-
tivist attitude, and the return to the primordial experience of 
reality, is a perspective that has much in common with the fun-
daments of phenomenology itself.20
 Our purpose here is not to demonstrate the links that could 
be drawn between Eastern and Western thought; ideas travel 
almost as fast as beings, as illustrated by the first stirrings of 
global philosophy in the encounter between the Chinese and the 
Jesuits missions in the sixteenth century—when Master Kong, 
Kongfuzi, became universally known through his Latinized name 
Confucius (551–479 BC).21  Rather, we aim to highlight some 
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examples of phenomenological reflection on architecture 
grounded in a specific context, what we may call Japanese 
spatiality.
 The roots of architecture are naturally deeply related to the 
cultural, social and physical milieus in which the architectural 
work is grounded, and we cannot ignore these influences on the 
conception of architecture.  Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) is 
perhaps the Kyoto philosopher who considered most deeply the 
question of space and the influence of “milieu” (fūdo 風土) on the 
production of space.  Much like his Kyoto school colleagues, 
Watsuji both studied and practiced Zen meditation, and a year 
before attending Heidegger’s lectures in Freiburg published the 
first philosophical study of Japanese Zen Master Dōgen (1200–
1253).22  Watsuji’s interests, as with most Japanese intelligentsia 
of the time, was divided between both Japanese and European 
culture.  He relates that it was while living in Germany in 1927 
that he first thought about the essence of milieu in relation to 
human existence.  He was then reading Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, and felt that the question of time should also have been 
related to the issue of space, “for time not linked with space is 
not time in the true sense.”23  In his book Fūdo, he focuses on the 
influence of the natural and social milieus on the structure of 
beings in space and time.  For example, in the first chapter, on 
the “phenomena of climate,” he analyzes the “phenomenon of 
cold”; one is tempted to suggest these insights were perhaps 
prompted by the experience of winter in an old Japanese house, 
where the winter chill enters from each articulation of the 
building.
 A winter spent in a “cold” traditional Kyoto house perhaps 
has little in common with the experience related by Gaston 
Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space.  In this book, Bachelard com-
ments on Baudelaire’s description of Thomas de Quincey’s 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821), where the French 
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poet presents the following scenario: “our hero” is retired “far, 
very far away from Oxford,… buried in the depths of the moun-
tains….  He has been studying German metaphysics; he reads 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling.”24  Quincey’s delight is a “true content-
ment of the scholar and solitary man who cherishes his comfort: 
a charming cottage, a handsome library,… with winter raging 
without.”25  Baudelaire asks: “Does not an attractive home render 
winter more poetic, and does not winter augment the poetry of 
the home?”26  Bachelard adds: “we feel warm because it is cold 
out-of-doors.”27  The colder outside, the warmer inside: this 
“contradiction” enhances the impression of comfort (Baudelaire 
uses the English word) in the house.  Lost in a Welsh valley sur-
rounded by mountains—or anywhere else outside the mundane 
world—this literary depiction of a dreamed landscape speaks to 
us.  Bachelard explains that we can re-fashion our image of this 
description in our imagination, and thus personalize it and make 
it our own, stating that: “well-determined centers of revery are 
means of communication between men who dream as surely as 
well-defined concepts are means of communication between 
men who think.”28  It is the task of the writer, the poet, the artist, 
the architect, to create this place of reverie where one can univer-
sally enter into contact with the essence of his intention.
 The issue is not to contrast one form of dwelling with another; 
we agree that everyone, everywhere, dwells poetically and forges 
symbolic relationships between their interior world (their mind) 
and the exterior world in which we live.  Let us return to our 
previous example of the Japanese house, in particular the famous 
style of the Kyoto urban house (machiya 町屋).  This dwelling, 
while giving the impression of separation from the street, hidden 
behind a wooden louver, is actually directly connected to the 
exterior and the natural environment.  The feeling of cold felt in 
the house in winter connects us immediately to the natural cold-
ness of the exterior.  According to Watsuji, this subjective 
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experience (the feeling of cold) establishes a relationship with a 
transcendental object (“coldness” or “cold”).  He states that:
When we feel the cold, it is not the “feeling of cold” that we feel, 
but the “coldness of the air” or the “cold.”  In other words, the cold 
felt in intentional experience is not subjective but objective….  
When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness of the 
outside air.  That we come into relation with the cold means that 
we are outside in the cold.  In this sense, our state is characterized 
by “ex-sistere” [to have gone outside] as Heidegger emphasizes, or 
in our term, by “intentionality.”29
The poetics of Japanese space
In a situation, where the outside cold is felt inside the house, as 
if we had gone outside, one could suggest that this represents a 
certain failure on behalf of the architect.  Nevertheless, there are 
places and circumstances where one could, consciously or not, 
appreciate the surprise generated by an architectural device.  In 
his famous essay In Praise of Shadows, Tanizaki Junichirō starts by 
explicating the difficulties faced in building a traditional Japanese 
house which includes all the necessities of modern life: heating, 
electric lighting and sanitary facilities.  Whilst critical of some 
aspects of modernization, Tanizaki explains that it should be 
possible to re-create some of the synesthetic feelings inherent in 
traditional architecture without sacrificing certain modern neces-
sities.  For instance, he describes the pleasure felt in the Japanese 
traditional toilet, as it stands “apart from the main building, at 
the end of a corridor, in a grove fragrant with leaves and moss.” 
He sees it as a place of “spiritual repose,” and (quoting the words 
of Natsume Sōseki) a “physiological delight”:
[T]here one can listen with such a sense of intimacy to the rain-
drops falling from the eaves and the trees, seeping into the earth as 
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they wash over the base of a stone lantern and freshen the moss 
about the stepping stones.  And the toilet is the perfect place to 
listen to the chirping of insects or the song of the birds, to view the 
moon, or to enjoy any of those poignant moments that mark the 
change of the seasons.  Here, I suspect, is where haiku poets over 
the ages have come by a great many of their ideas.30
 Despite the possibility of catching a winter cold, Tanizaki 
suggests that: “our forebears, making poetry of everything in their 
lives, transformed what by rights should be the most unsanitary 
room into a place of unsurpassed elegance.”31  At several points 
in this essay, Tanizaki emphasizes the fact that our ancestors—
“our” here could be of universal value—have always tried to find 
poetic value in their dwelling.  Creating the opportunity for the 
poetic interpretation of space can be considered the root of archi-
tectural creation.
 In architecture, there are several types of construction that 
can be conceived of as a privileged place for a spiritual experience 
or gathering: temples, churches, museums, the main function of 
all of which is to create a particular experience of space.  In Japan, 
the narrow space of the tearoom (chashitsu 茶室) has always been 
referred to as a concentration of a peculiar spatial experience. 
Tanizaki, in a provocative stance, deliberately avoids this exam-
ple, which he considers too remote from his concern with mun-
dane daily life: “For the solitary eccentrics it is another matter, he 
can ignore the blessings of scientific civilization and retreat to 
some forsaken corner of the countryside.”32  What the English 
translation does not really show is that for “eccentric” Tanizaki 
refers to the “man of tea” (chajin 茶人), usually a scholar, a man of 
letters, who desires to retreat from the world to a type of hermit-
age—a “thatched hut” (sōan 草庵)—inside nature.  Tanizaki is not 
attempting to advocate a return to nature or to the architecture 
of the past, but rather to find inside ordinary life places that can 
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satisfy both his cultural and aesthetic senses.  He then points out 
that in a Nara or Kyoto temple, “the tearoom [cha no ma 茶の間] 
may have its charms, but the Japanese toilet is truly a place of 
spiritual repose.”33  This association may seem surreal, but an 
architect can learn from this perspective that each space of the 
house, whatever its function may be, should add to the pleasure 
of dwelling.  If not everyone can have a tearoom, at least more 
ordinary spaces should also be conceived with sensitivity.
 The tearoom is a space created for the awakening of both the 
senses and the mind.  From the early beginning of Zen Buddhism, 
in the twelfth century, tea drinking has been used as a medium 
for meditation, with the first tearooms built in Kyoto by Zen 
monks at the end of the fifteenth century.34  Based on the model 
of the hermitage, the tearoom built inside a town would ideally 
allow “living in town as if living in the country” (shichū sankyo 市
中山居).  The hermitage is described as an impermanent construc-
tion, a shelter for one night, built by the scholar himself.35  A 
tearoom can be built for a special occasion; it emphasizes the 
ideas of immediateness, “here and now,” and the intensity of an 
instant, an encounter that can only happen “once in one’s life.”36 
This place condenses both time and space around the art of tea 
in order to enjoy each instant as if it were the last: it shows both 
an ethical obligation and an esthetic appreciation of the imper-
manent values of space and time.  The materiality of the tea-
room, the natural essence of materials but also the naturalness of 
their use, also corresponds to this phenomenological approach to 
space.  Everything is made of natural materials, and materials 
that express a natural essence.  The visitor enters a narrow space 
(from 2 to 4.5 tatami mats: 3.3 to 7.3 m2) via a low entrance by 
walking on their knees (nijiri-guchi 躙り口) symbolic of a return 
to childhood, an abandonment of all their past experience in 
order to facilitate the new.
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 Kyoto Zen Buddhist temples always incorporate teahouses 
that seem to embody both the religious and philosophical experi-
ence of the world.  Regarding the possibility of a phenomeno-
logical approach to Zen, Algis Mickunas points out that: 
“Phenomenology and Zen seem to agree on one common theme: 
unobstructed vision, a direct seeing prior to divisions into spiri-
tual and sensory.”37  Enlightenment (satori 悟り) is reached in Zen 
practice through meditation on a kōan (公案, literally translated 
as “public proposal”), a process that could plausibly be compared 
to a phenomenological reduction; both are attempts at discovering 
the “essence” of things through an immediate and intuitive, 
rather than intellectually constructed, method.  This radical 
approach to the essence of things is also the starting point of 
architectural work.
Five approaches relating architecture and phenomenology
The following texts exemplify the diversity of approaches relat-
ing architecture to phenomenology, and vice-versa.  The book 
proceeds on the basis of five perspectives, combining both philo-
sophical and architectural approaches : (1) Atmospheres; (2) 
Matters; (3) Bodies; (4) Cultures; (5) Unfoldings.
 The first section, entitled “Atmospheres,” considers architec-
tural spaces as given through sensation and feeling—that is to 
say, this section focuses on the impressions and meanings trans-
mitted by architectural spaces to the person who is a part of that 
space.  Architecture embodies an experience that is neither reduc-
ible to straightforward spatial perception, nor to a series of func-
tions, but calls for the wholeness of our being-in-the-world.  From 
the perspective of this fundamental idea, it is thus possible to 
take into account the “Matters” (or Materials) used by the archi-
tect.  Such materials are not treated from a technical point of 
view, but rather in relation to architectural phenomena as such—
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as it is perceived, felt, and experienced.  This leads logically to a 
consideration of the “Bodies” that experience the materials. 
These bodies are multiple (perceiving body, feeling body, think-
ing body, individual or collective, etc.) and consequently need to 
be spoken of in the plural.  Architecture, through its singular 
creations, reveals both the power and true dimensions latent in 
these bodies.  Far from being detached from any kind of concrete 
place or history, these three aspects (Atmospheres, Matters, 
Bodies) are, on the contrary, always a part of specific “Cultures,” 
the next section of the book.  What is culture, indeed, if not a 
proper mode of inhabiting reality, the giving of a concrete, sin-
gular form to human experience?  Finally, the book leads us 
towards its “Unfoldings,” the opening of new perspectives for 
phenomenology.
 Throughout these five chapters, through a large array of 
architectural realizations—from ancient Greek temples, Chinese 
and Japanese gardens, to the work of contemporary architects 
such as Tange Kenzō—architecture is considered from the phe-
nomenological standpoint as a human practice providing ele-
mentary data—such as space, volume, place, time, matter and 
body—with a meaning; that is to say, the realization of this data 
as an experience.  To the philosopher, the book provides a precise 
analysis of concrete cases, thus permitting a testing of the rele-
vance and effectiveness of the salient concepts, both esthetical 
and ethical.  The architect on the other hand is presented with a 
reflexive gaze on everyday work, as well as the tools with which 
to rethink the reality of architectural practice.
Benoît Jacquet and Vincent Giraud
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Notes
 1.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’œil et l’esprit (Paris: Gallimard, 2010 
[1964]), 81; English trans.: Eye and Mind, in Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy 
of Perception and other Essays, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), 186.
 2.  Ibid.
 3.  “Les matériaux de l’urbanisme sont le soleil, l’espace, les arbres, 
l’acier et le ciment armé, dans cet ordre et dans cette hiérarchie.”  Le 
Corbusier, CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne), Athens, 
1933.
 4.  Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970), 48–9. Will subsequently be referred to as Crisis.
 5.  See Edmund Husserl’s introduction to Logische Untersuchungen 
[Logical Investigations], Husserliana, vol. XVIII (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1975), 
6: “Wir wollen auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen.” See also Husserliana, 
vol. XIX, 10: “Wir wollen uns schlechterdings nicht mit ‘blossen Worten’… 
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